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Did New York State Just Anoint
Virtual Currencies by Proposing to
Regulate Them, or Will Regulation
Spoil Them for Some?
Sarah Jane Hughes
Abstract
This Essay previews issues raised by the general subject of
regulating virtual currencies and the specific efforts of New York
State’s Department of Financial Services’ proposed Virtual
Currency Regulatory Framework (the BitLicense) in particular. It
focuses on five topics in the proposal and their interplay with the
current regulation of “money services” and “money transmission”
in other states, using the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State
of Washington approaches on a few common topics for comparison
purposes. It also asks whether regulation of virtual currencies is
likely to cause more widespread adoption of virtual currencies or
to frustrate the proponents and current users and so reduce the
use of virtual currencies.
 Sarah Jane Hughes is the University Scholar and Fellow in
Commercial Law at the Maurer School of Law, Indiana University in
Bloomington, Indiana. She is a graduate of the University of Washington’s
School of Law and of Mount Holyoke College. For more than 15 years, Professor
Hughes has published articles on developments related to electronic payments
and financial services in law journals, including the Business Lawyer, the
Boston University Annual Review of Banking Law, and others. She thanks the
editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review for the invitation to contribute
this Essay and for their superb suggestions on the initial draft. She also wishes
to acknowledge her long-time co-author Stephen T. Middlebrook for his initial
analysis of the New York State Department of Financial Services’ proposed
Virtual Currency Regulatory Framework, some of which is discussed in this
Essay, prepared for a separate, co-authored article. For other portions of the
analysis of the BitLicense proposal and for other observations about regulating
virtual currencies generally—and for all errors, she accepts all responsibility.
The research for this Essay was concluded on September 4, 2014 after some
comments on the BitLicense proposal had already been filed with the New York
State’s Department of Financial Services.
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I. Introduction
My late mother was a free thinker. She favored legalizing
lots of products and behaviors to (a) remove their mystique or
“cool factor,” (b) make it easier to tax them, and (c) make them
less attractive to criminals. She preferred regulating behaviors to
criminalizing them. This year, as laws went into effect legalizing
marijuana,1 Mom’s preference for regulating behavior rather than
criminalizing it keeps coming to mind. I keep wondering what
1. See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, Oregon Expects Up To $40 Million in New
Revenue Annually If Voters Legalize Pot This Fall, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/08/11/oregon-expects-upto-40-million-in-new-revenue-annually-if-voters-legalize-pot-this-fall/
(last
visited Sept. 22, 2014) (discussing the impact of Oregon’s proposal to legalize
marijuana) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Colorado and
Washington legalized the recreational use of marijuana in 2012, and voters in
Alaska and the District of Columbia will vote on similar legislation this fall. Id.
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Mom would think about virtual currencies, another “product”
that might have “just arrived” because of recent federal and
pending state efforts to regulate aspects of their use.
Virtual currencies were regulated for some purposes at the
federal level when the Treasury Department took its first steps in
March 20132 and subsequent steps in 2014.3 New York State’s
Department of Financial Services (DFS) announced in July 2014
the first specific licensing scheme (hereinafter referred to as
“BitLicenses”) for those engaging in “virtual currency business
activity.”4 New York State’s proposed BitLicense regime would
require licensure,5 prudential regulation,6 certain transaction
reporting,7 and numerous user disclosures.8
2. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013), http://www.fincen.gov/
statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [hereinafter 2013 FinCEN
Guidance] (clarifying “the applicability of the regulations implementing the
Bank Security Act (“BSA”) to persons creating, obtaining, distributing,
exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies”).
3. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN2014-R001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY
MINING OPERATIONS
(2014),
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/
pdf/FIN-2014-R001.pdf (explaining the application of FinCEN’s regulations,
specifically the Bank Secrecy Act, to virtual currency mining operations); FIN.
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-R002,
APPLICATION OF FINCEN”S REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT AND CERTAIN INVESTMENT ACTIVITY (2014), http://www.fincen/gov/
news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-R002.pdf (responding to concerns about a
company’s qualifications as a money transmitter under the BSA when that
company produces and distributes software to facilitate its purchase of virtual
currency); U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS NOTICE 2014-21 (Mar. 25,
2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf (describing “how existing
general tax principles apply to transactions using virtual currency”).
4. See Regulation of the Conduct of Virtual Currency Businesses, XXXVI
N.Y. Reg. 14 (July 23, 2014) [hereinafter BitLicense Proposed Regulations]
(discussing the licensing requirement for all virtual currency transactions). The
full text of the regulations is referenced in the administrative register notice
and can be found at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr1407171-vc.pdf.
5. See id. § 200.3 (establishing requirements for licensure).
6. See id. § 200.7 (requiring the Licensee to comply with applicable laws,
rules, and regulations).
7. See, e.g., id. § 200.15(j)(5) (requiring the Licensee to designate
individuals who shall “[p]rovide periodic reporting, at least annually, to the
board of directors, senior management, or appropriate governing body”).
8. See, e.g., id. § 200.19(a) (requiring the Licensee to disclose “all material
risks associated with its products, services, and activities”); id. § 200.14
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New York State’s proposed regulations will suit one of Mom’s
three tests—making products easier to tax. It also might make
the use of virtual currencies safer. However, for proponents and
many users of virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, regulation
might “ruin” the mystique that virtual currencies and Bitcoin in
particular have enjoyed. It is not clear whether encumbering
virtual currencies is part of New York’s strategy.
This Essay lays out the key features of New York State’s
BitLicense proposal and makes some preliminary observations
about its features in Part II. In Parts III through V, it asks
questions about regulating emerging technologies that are based
on regulatory activity related to virtual currencies from March 1,
2013 to August 21, 2014. However, it does not answer all of these
questions, primarily because the proposal is not final and is likely
to be adjusted before becoming final.
II. New York State’s BitLicense Proposal
On July 17, 2014, New York State’s DFS proposed a
comprehensive regulatory regime for those who support Bitcoin
transactions or trade in Bitcoin.9 This regime covers Bitcoin as
media for transmitting value from one person to another and as a
form of property.10 It requires persons and entities that wish to
engage in “virtual currency business activity” involving New York
persons to first obtain a BitLicense to operate.11 It also provides
for mandatory disclosures,12 an elaborate customer-identification

(requiring the Licensee to provide quarterly financial statements).
9. See BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4 (discussing the
licensing requirement for all virtual currency transactions). For more
information, see Press Release, NY DFS Releases Proposed BitLicense
Regulatory Framework for Virtual Currency Firms, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
FINANCIAL SERVS. (July 17, 2014), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/
pr1407171.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release] (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.2(m) (defining
“virtual currency”).
11. Id. § 200.3(a).
12. Id. § 200.14.
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program,13 and more transaction reporting than the federal Bank
Secrecy Act14 requires.15
The proposal’s definition of the key term “virtual currency
business transaction” is expansive.16 The definition covers most,
but not all, of the types of electronic payments and financial
services issues that my frequent co-author Stephen T.
Middlebrook and I have been writing about for some years.17
13. Id. § 200.15(g).
14. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508,
84 Stat. 111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
15. Compare BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.14
(imposing detailed reporting requirements for all BitLicensees), with 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5313–16 (2012) (imposing less onerous reporting requirements for currency
transactions and transportation of currency above certain amounts).
16. See BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.2(n)
Virtual Currency Business Activity means the conduct of any one of
the following types of activities involving New York or a New York
Resident:
(1) receiving Virtual Currency for transmission or transmitting the
same;
(2) securing, storing, holding, or maintaining custody or control of
Virtual Currency on behalf of others;
(3) buying and selling Virtual Currency as a customer business;
(4) performing retail conversion services, including the conversion or
exchange of Fiat Currency or other value into Virtual Currency, the
conversion or exchange of Virtual Currency into Fiat Currency or
other value, or the conversion or exchange of one form of Virtual
Currency into another form of Virtual Currency; or
(5) controlling, administering, or issuing a Virtual Currency.
17. See, e.g., Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating
Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future Directions, 40
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813, 815–22, 825–27 (2014) [hereinafter Regulating
Cryptocurrencies in the United States] (reviewing recent cryptocurrency
developments and discussing the expansive definition of “money transmitting”
in 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2012)); Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes,
Virtual Uncertainty: Developments in the Law of Electronic Payments and
Financial Services, 69 BUS. LAW. 263, 264–69 (2013) (discussing developments in
cryptocurrency law in 2013); Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T. Middlebrook, &
Broox W. Peterson, Developments in the Law Concerning Stored-Value Cards
and Other Electronic Payments Products, 63 BUS. LAW. 237, 255–62 (2007)
(explaining the e-gold Ltd. prosecution and the definition of “money
transmission” on which the case was centered).
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As a prototype for virtual currency regulations, New York’s
prescriptive proposal immediately drew negative attention from
the Bitcoin community18 and others.19 The balance of this Part
presents some of the most salient features of the BitLicense
proposal and offers preliminary thoughts on them.
The BitLicense proposal would require anyone who engages
in “Virtual Currency Business Activity” to obtain a license,20 meet
certain capital requirements,21 maintain records,22 file financial
reports,23 be subject to examination,24 and maintain collateral to
secure any virtual currency held on behalf of others.25 Licensees
also will be required to appoint compliance officers and establish
compliance policies;26 create, monitor, and maintain both antimoney laundering programs27 and cybersecurity programs;28 and
18. See, e.g., Erik Voorhees, Reflection on the NYDFS BitLicense Proposal
and the Right of Privacy, MONEY & ST.
(July 18, 2014),
http://moneyandstate.com/reflections-right-privacy-response-nydfs-bitcoinproposal (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (criticizing New York’s BitLicense
regulations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Tone Vays, Top
5 Issues with the NYSDFS BitLicense Proposal, COINTELEGRAPH (July 24, 2014,
11:18 PM), http://cointelegraph.com/news/112141/top-5-issues-with-the-nysdfsbitlicense-proposal (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (explaining various issues with
the BitLicense proposal and providing links to three additional commentaries on
the BitLicense proposal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Ryan Selkin, Bitcoin at a Crossroads: Tackling the BitLicense, TWO BIT IDIOT
(July 19, 2014, 9:20 AM), http://two-bit-idiot.tumblr.com/post/92143258184/
bitcoin-at-a-crossroads-tackling-the-bitlicense (last visited Sept. 22, 2014)
(dividing aspects of the proposed BitLicense into “the good, the bad, and the
ugly”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See, e.g., JERRY BRITO & ELI DOURADO, COMMENTS TO THE NEW YORK
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES ON THE PROPOSED VIRTUAL CURRENCY
REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
(2014),
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/
BritoDourado-NY-Virtual-Currency-comment-081414.pdf. Messrs. Brito and
Dourado address issues they have with the proposed Virtual Currencies
Regulatory Framework not discussed in this Essay; readers will want to read
their work in full.
20. See BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.3(a).
21. Id. § 200.8.
22. Id. § 200.12.
23. Id. § 200.14.
24. Id. § 200.13.
25. Id. § 200.9.
26. Id. § 200.7.
27. Id. § 200.15.
28. Id. § 200.16.
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have and share with the DFS their business-continuity plans.29
The DFS will have authority to review and approve each
licensee’s advertising and marketing materials.30 Licensees will
be required to make detailed disclosures to customers before a
transaction.31 In addition, and beyond some types of consumer
financial disclosure requirements, the licensee will be required to
obtain the user’s acknowledgement of each disclosure,32 provide
receipts for transactions,33 and establish a complaint resolution
procedure.34
The proposal also goes well beyond the requirements for
banks and others involved in “electronic fund transfers” governed
by federal law:35 Licensees must implement an anti-fraud policy
and provide for customers who are defrauded to receive
compensation.36 Additionally, in contrast to the manner in which
many non-bank providers operate, BitLicense holders will be
required to obtain advance approval from the DFS for material
changes to their products and services.37
A. Proposed Definition of “Virtual Currency”
The BitLicense proposal defines “virtual currency” as “any
type of digital unit that is used as a medium of exchange or form
of digitally stored value or that is incorporated into payment
system technology.”38 The term is to be “broadly construed,” but it
does not include digital units used solely as part of customer
affinity or rewards programs that can only be redeemed by
designated merchants and may not be converted to cash; nor does
29. Id. § 200.17.
30. Id. § 200.18(b).
31. Id. § 200.19(a)–(c).
32. Id. § 200.19(d).
33. Id. § 200.19(e).
34. Id. § 200.20.
35. See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (describing Regulation E,
the regulatory framework governing institutions involved in electronic fund
transfers).
36. BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.19(g).
37. Id. § 200.10.
38. Id. § 200.2(m).
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the term include currencies used only within online gaming
platforms.39 The proposed definition does not follow the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) regulatory scheme,
which only covers virtual currencies that are used as substitutes
for “legal tender.”40 Without this limitation in the proposed
BitLicense definition, it is unclear what prevents the BitLicense
proposal from applying to other electronic forms of legal tender—
specifically, electronic access to dollar-denominated demand
deposit accounts.41
B. Definition of “Virtual Currency Business Activity”
Under the proposed regulations, a license is required for
those individuals and entities that wish to engage in “Virtual
Currency Business Activity.”42 The term is defined to include
“transmitting” virtual currency; “securing, storing, holding or
maintaining custody or control” of virtual currency for others;
buying and selling virtual currency “as a customer business”;
performing “retail conversion services”; or “controlling,
administering, or issuing a Virtual Currency.”43 The scope of
activities included here is significantly broader than that
traditionally covered by the “money services” and “money

39. Id.
40. See 2013 FinCEN Guidance, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that virtual
currency is not legal tender and explicitly stating that FinCEN guidance only
applies to virtual currencies that are “convertible” into legal tender). Under the
FinCEN scheme, only certain virtual currency activities constitute “money
transmission.” See id. at 3 (concluding that certain administrators and
exchangers of virtual currency fall within the definition of “money transmitters”
and are thus subject to federal regulation). For more information, see THE
CLEARING HOUSE & INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., VIRTUAL CURRENCY: RISKS AND
REGULATION (2014).
41. See Stephen T. Middlebrook, Analysis of the New York State
Department of Financial Services Proposed BitLicense Regulations 12 (Jul. 27,
2014) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Middlebrook Manuscript] (noting
that the use of term “fiat currency” at § 200.2(d) carries with it many unhelpful
connotations that may obscure legal and policy discussions about virtual
currency, and suggesting that the DFS use the term “legal tender” instead of
“fiat currency”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.3(a).
43. Id. § 200.2(n).
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transmitter” statutes upon which these regulations are based.44
For example, it is unclear whether providing software services,
which enable some of these activities, might trigger a licensing
obligation.
The proposed BitLicense also might apply to depository
institutions that are generally exempt from similar money
transmitter requirements.45 Although there is a limited
exemption from the BitLicense requirements for entities licensed
as exchange services,46 banks that want to provide virtual
currency services would appear to be required to obtain the
additional BitLicense.47 This problem may be resolved if the final
regulation more effectively distinguishes between “legal tender”
and virtual currency acting as a substitute for legal tender.
The definition of “Virtual Currency Business Activity” is
limited to activities “involving New York or a New York
resident.”48 This phrase is so broad that it raises more questions
about the proposal’s scope than it answers. For nearly all virtual
currency participants, but particularly for math-based currencies
such as Bitcoin, it is extremely difficult to prevent one’s business
activities from involving a particular jurisdiction or certain
residents in many jurisdictions. More attention to this portion of
the BitLicense proposal should be given in order to clarify the
application to New York residents who use virtual currencies
while traveling to other states and similar in-person interactions
with providers.49 Mr. Middlebrook recently suggested that the
44. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.010(17)–(19) (2012) (defining
“money services,” “money transmission,” and “money transmitter”); VA. CODE
ANN. § 6.2-1900 (2012) (providing definitions of various terms, including “money
transmission” and “money transmitter”).
45. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.030 (requiring licensure for
businesses engaged in money transmission); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1901
(requiring licensure for businesses “selling money orders or engag[ing] in the
business of money transmission”).
46. BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.3(c).
47. See id. § 200.3(a) (“No Person shall, without a license obtained from the
superintendent as provided in this Part, engage in any Virtual Currency
Business Activity.”).
48. Id. § 200.2(n).
49. The potential extraterritorial application of the DFS proposal may run
afoul of the Commerce Clause to the United States Constitution. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained in Midwest Title
Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 83
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DFS should craft a jurisdictional “safe harbor” delineating what
steps a virtual currency business would need to take in order to
be assured that it was not engaged in activity involving New York
and thus not subject to regulation.50
C. Liquidity Requirements
The BitLicense proposal requires that entities holding virtual
funds on behalf of another person must hold the same type and
amount of virtual currency that the bank owes the person who
deposited the funds.51 This requirement will mean that the entity
that is serving as the transfer agent will need to hold precisely
the same virtual currency and the identical amount in that
currency—that is, $1,000 worth of Bitcoin for each $1,000 of
(2010):
The interference [by the State of Indiana] was with a commercial
activity that occurred in another state[, Illinois]. Each title loan that
Midwest made to a Hoosier was in the form of a check, drawn on an
Illinois bank, that was handed to the borrower at Midwest’s loan
office and could be cashed there. Illinois was also where the
conditional transfer of title to the collateral was made (the handing
over of the keys-the “pawn”), and where the payments required by the
loan agreement were received by Midwest. The contract was, in short,
made and executed in Illinois, and that is enough to show that the
territorial-application provision violates the commerce clause.
Id. at 669. The Seventh Circuit upheld an injunction entered by a district court
against enforcement of an Indiana Code provision that involved the
extraterritorial application of a law designed to limit predatory lending
practices. See id. at 667–69 (affirming the injunction and concluding that
“allow[ing] Indiana to apply its law against title loans when its residents
transact in a different state that has a different law would be arbitrarily to exalt
the public policy of one state over that of another”); see also IND. CODE
§ 24-4.5-1-201 (2014) (requiring extraterritorial application of certain provisions
and state licensure requirements for out-of-state lenders marketing to and
soliciting loans from residents of Indiana). The Seventh Circuit concluded that
the violation of the Commerce Clause resulted, as described above, from the fact
that the consumer borrower physically traveled into Illinois to execute the
transaction and that all events related to it took place in Illinois, where the
transaction was not covered by Indiana’s laws. Midwest Title Loans, 593 F.3d at
669. New York may face similar issues if it tries to apply the DFS regulations to
virtual currency transactions between non-New York citizens and New York
residents living outside New York.
50. Middlebrook Manuscript, supra note 41, at 12.
51. BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.9(b).
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Bitcoin being transferred, not $1,000 in some form of virtual
currency such as Dogecoin.52
The requirement of like-kind holdings is new even for money
transmitters, who are more likely by state statutes and
regulations to be required to hold funds or other forms of
“permissible investments” in certain ranges. For example,
Washington State requires that licensees “shall maintain, at all
times, permissible investments that have a market value
computed in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles of not less than the amount of the licensee’s average
outstanding money transmission liability,” describes how to
calculate the average outstanding amount of liability, and grants
the director authority to limit the types of holdings by regulation
unless the type is “money, time deposits, savings deposits,
demand deposits, and certificates of deposit issued by a federally
insured financial institution.”53 Washington State’s Money
Services Act also deals with liquidity issues in three additional
provisions—in terms of requirements for surety bonds or
security,54 tangible net worth for holders of money transmitter
licenses,55 and types of permissible investments.56
52. See Comparison of Cryptocurrencies, BITCOIN WIKI (last updated Sept.
22, 2014, 1:34 PM), https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/List_of_alternative_crypto
currencies (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (showing launch dates, market caps, and
protocols for 15 of the largest cryptocurrencies, including Dogecoin and Bitcoin)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.200(1)-(2) (2013) (requiring licensees to
maintain permissible investments that have a market value computed in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles of not less than the
amount of the licensee’s average outstanding money transmission liability).
54. See id. § 19.230.050(1) (mandating that amount of the surety bond or
other security must be equivalent to the previous year’s money transmission
dollar volume, with a minimum amount of “at least $10,000 not to exceed
$550,000”). The director may require security up to $1,000,000 if a licensee’s
financial condition “so requires,” including when it has experienced a reduction
in net worth, financial losses, or in other cases. Id. § 19.230.050(6).
55. See id § 19.230.060 (requiring net worth to be “at least $10,000” and not
more than $3,000,000; if the net worth declines to less than the required
amount, the director may commence an action for license suspension pursuant
to WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.230).
56. See id. § 19.230.210(1)(a)-(f) (listing dozens of categories of acceptable
investments, including cash, time deposits, savings deposits, demand deposits,
certificates of deposit, senior debt obligations of insured depositary institutions,
highly rated securities, and governmental bonds, among others).
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The one-for-one ratio in the BitLicense requirement is more
like the prevailing model for non-depository “money transmitters”
in states such as Virginia, which also uses a one-to-one ratio
requirement for monies being transmitted.57 This means that a
money transmitter in Virginia such as Western Union would
have to hold identical value for the monies being transmitted.
A third model that requires neither the like-kind holding nor
the one-to-one ratio is the “deposit” model, which relies on the
principle of “fractional deposits.”58
D. Anti-Money-Laundering and Customer-Identification
Requirements
U.S. anti-money-laundering (“AML”) laws generally allow for
entity-driven, risk-based assessments and the implementation,
monitoring, and repetitive adjustments and retraining of
personnel to ensure compliance.59 They give covered businesses
considerable latitude to assess their own risks and to determine
various means to avoid transactions and individuals or entities
seeking to launder money through their facilities.
The proposed BitLicense regulatory scheme is more
prescriptive than risk-based.60 Customer identification is not a
general requirement under state money service business or
money transmitter acts.61 The USA PATRIOT Act62 imposed
§ 326 “customer identification program” requirements only on

57.
58.

See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1900 (2012).
See JOSHUA N. FEINMAN, RESERVE REQUIREMENTS: HISTORY, CURRENT
PRACTICE, AND POTENTIAL REFORM 573 (1993), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/0693lead.pdf (explaining that a fractional reserve system is “one
with reserve requirements of less than 100 percent”).
59. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 1000–1099 (2013) (containing the implementing
regulations for FinCEN).
60. See infra notes 61–72 and accompanying text (comparing and
contrasting the prescriptive portions of the BitLicense proposal, which includes
suspicious activity reporting and record-retention requirements, with more
risk-based, situational state and federal statutes already in place).
61. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.2-1916–1917 (listing reporting
requirements for licensees, none of which include customer identification).
62. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
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those “financial institutions”63 that Treasury Department
regulations required to adopt § 352 “anti-money-launderingcompliance programs.”64
In contrast, the BitLicense scheme requires that the licensee
capture customer identification information that includes the
account holder’s name and physical location.65 The federal
“customer-identification-program” requirement does not require
capture or retention of the customer’s “physical location.”66
In addition to other new AML and customer-identification
requirements in the BitLicense proposal, the proposal requires
licensees to file “suspicious activity reports” with the State of
New York, even if FinCEN’s regulations would not require a
filing.67 The proposed regulations also require that suspicious
activity reports be filed within twenty-four hours,68 as opposed to
the “within 30 days” period allowed by FinCEN.69 The virtual
currency community likely will see these requirements as
problematic because they exceed the duties created under
FinCEN’s regulations.70 Another issue that affects AML and the
63. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2012) (defining “financial institution”).
64. See id. § 5318(h) (requiring financial institutions to establish and
maintain “anti-money laundering programs”). The interagency rule
implementing the customer-identification program was codified at 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.121 (2013).
65. BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.15(g)(1).
66. See 31 C.F.R § 1020.220 (2013) (requiring certain financial institutions
to record and verify customers’ names, addresses and the identities, account
numbers, and federal tax identification (SSN or EIN) numbers if the transaction
is being conducted on behalf of another person or entity). The Bitcoin
community comments on the New York State proposal raised issues about the
feasibility of a requirement to record the customer’s physical location because of
the ease of adopting a situs different from an actual situs, as well as attendant
enforcement issues for a wallet or exchange that collected information that later
proved to be inaccurate.
67. BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.15(d)(3).
FinCEN’s regulations require a filing if a transaction is suspicious, or if it
involves a transfer of $2,000 or more. See 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320 (2013) (requiring
reports for transactions “of at least $2,000”).
68. BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.15(d)(2)
(requiring the Licensee to report within twenty-four hours any transactions
executed by one person in one day and exceeding $10,000).
69. See 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320(b)(3) (2013) (noting that money service
businesses have thirty days to file suspicious activity reports).
70. This prospect could be especially intimidating because the DFS has
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suspicious activity reporting responsibility include a ten-year
record-retention period for transactions,71 as compared with five
years under FinCEN’s regulations.72 The more onerous DFS
proposals concerning the scope of suspicious activity reporting
and the timeframe within which reports must reach the DFS both
are vulnerable to preemption claims.
My colleague, Mr. Middlebrook, asked two additional
questions about the scope of the DFS’s AML set of proposals:
First, if DFS collects these suspicious activity reports, what will it
do with the data?73 And, second, will the data received enjoy the
same protections, such as under the Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 197874 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act,75 that they
currently have under federal law?76
E. Consumer Disclosures
The proposed BitLicense borrows disclosure requirements
from other regulatory silos and takes them one or more steps
further. For example, its prescriptive consumer disclosure
requirements exceed those imposed under many of the models for

been so aggressive in pursuing violations by foreign banks, particularly
violations of the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act and economic sanctions laws. See, e.g.,
Michael Virtanen, NY Regulators Sanction Standard Chartered Bank, YAHOO!
NEWS (Aug. 19, 2014, 3:11 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/ny-regulators-sanctionstandard-chartered-bank-181510618.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2014)
(describing how DFS imposed a $300 million penalty on Standard Chartered
Bank for failure to fix compliance problems with the terms of a two-year-old
settlement regarding a federal prohibition against money laundering) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.12(a).
72. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(a)(2).
73. Middlebrook Manuscript, supra note 41, at 12–13.
74. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2012) (creating, with exceptions, statutory
rights to replace the Fourth Amendment protection for records held by
“financial institutions” as that term is defined in 12 U.S.C. § 3401(1) in partial
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976)).
75. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012) (containing limitations on sharing
of information from consumers’ credit histories with law enforcement agencies
and others).
76. Middlebrook Manuscript, supra note 41, at 12–13.
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analogous products.77 An example of this is the BitLicense
proposal requirement that licensees make initial disclosures that
will inform customers of a long list of “material risks” associated
with virtual currency, including (1) the fact that it is not legal
tender or FDIC insured and may be adversely affected by
legislative
and
regulatory
change,
(2) payment/transfer
transactions are generally irreversible, and (3) there is no
assurance that other parties will continue to accept virtual
currency.78 Additionally, BitLicensees must disclose “general
terms and conditions” such as the customer’s liability for
unauthorized transactions; privacy policies; and the customer’s
right to receive statements, receipts, and prior notice of
changes.79 In addition to the initial sets of disclosures, the
BitLicense proposal will require transactional disclosures to be
made prior to each transaction, detailing the type and amount of
the transaction and any fees to be assessed along with a warning
that the transaction may not be reversed.80 The BitLicense
proposal also requires that a licensee ensure that all disclosures
are “acknowledged as received by customers.”81 This
acknowledgement requirement is unprecedented in U.S.
regulation of financial services.
This disclosure scheme is far more rigid and detailed than
that imposed on money transmitters and electronic payment
providers. In contrast, the regulation implementing the federal
Electronic Fund Transfer Act,82 “Regulation E,”83 does not require
“material risk” disclosures, and its required initial disclosures
focus on product features and limitations, liability, and fees.84
Even in broker-dealer and investment advisor contexts, “material
facts” disclosure requirements are limited to situations in which
the provider owes a fiduciary duty to the customer.85
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
clients.

BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.19.
Id. § 200.19(a)(1)–(3), (6).
Id. § 200.19(b)(1), (4)–(7).
Id. § 200.19(c).
Id. § 200.19(d).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2012).
12 C.F.R. § 205.7 (2013)
Id.
Investment advisors are considered to have fiduciary responsibilities to
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DUTIES OF BROKERS, DEALERS, AND
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F. Consumer Recovery for Fraud

One of the most potentially burdensome provisions in the
BitLicense proposal is language that appears to make licensees
liable for fraud: “Licensees are prohibited from engaging in
fraudulent activity and customers of Licensees that are victims of
fraud shall be entitled to claim compensation from any trust
account, bond, or insurance policy maintained by the Licensee.”86
This portion of the BitLicense proposal raises a number of issues.
Among these are:
 The proposal renders licensees liable for engaging in
fraudulent
activity.
That
seems
relatively
straightforward. However, under the Money Services and
Money Transmitter regimes in Washington State and
Virginia used elsewhere in this Essay for comparison
purposes, licensees are responsible for failure to
perform—in the sense that they do not deliver the funds
entrusted to them to the named beneficiary. They are not

INVESTMENT ADVISERS, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 34,69013, 3 (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2013/34-69013.pdf [hereinafter SEC Release
34,69013] (“Investment advisers are fiduciaries to their clients, and their
regulation under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) is largely
principles-based.”). Broker-dealers are not normally treated as fiduciaries to
their clients. Id.; see also id. at 3, n.3 (acknowledging that broker-dealers “may
have a fiduciary duty under certain circumstances”). State common law
normally defines the instances in which broker-dealers owe duties to their
customers, including when the broker-dealer exercises “discretion or control
over customer assets, or [has] a relationship of trust and confidence with their
customers”; the broker-dealer then “owes a fiduciary duty similar to that of
investment advisors.” Id. (citing United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.
2006) (additional citations omitted)). For more information and relevant case
law, see SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERDEALERS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 54–55 (2011), www.sec.gov/news/studies/
2011/913studyfinal.pdf (explaining that a broker-dealer may have a fiduciary
duty under some circumstances and citing to relevant case law). In the Study,
the SEC’s staff made recommendations for “enhanced retail customer
protections” and also to “decrease retail customers’ confusion about the standard
of conduct owed to them when their financial professional provides them
personalized investment advice.” SEC Release 34,69013, at 6 (internal citations
omitted).
86. BitLicense Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 200.19(g).
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explicitly held liable for conduct that otherwise is
“fraudulent.”87
The proposal does not define the word “fraud.” Proving a
prima facie case for fraud requires a showing of “a
material misrepresentation of a fact, knowledge of its
falsity, an intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance by
the plaintiff[,] and damages.”88 Because these elements
are “narrowly defined,” they require “proof by clear and
convincing evidence.”89
The proposal does not describe a claims process. Despite
the reference to claims, it is unclear whether the
regulation is intended to create a private right of action
for users generally (not just consumers) or whether it
would limit a licensee’s liability to the value of any trust
account, bond, or insurance policy that the DFS may
require of holders of BitLicenses.90

III. General Questions about Regulating New Technologies Such
as Virtual Currencies
Since my first exploration of issues surrounding e-payments
nearly twenty years ago,91 I have been asking a series of
questions about regulating them. These questions include:
 For what purposes do we regulate emerging technologies?
 At what point should we regulate emerging technologies?
 Could the point for regulation differ depending on the
nature of regulations being contemplated?

87. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1904(C) (2012) (requiring bond to remain in
effect for five years after the licensee ceases to be in business); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.230.050 (2012) (same).
88. Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward & Kissel, LLP, 910 N.E.2d 976, 979
(N.Y. 2009).
89. Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 725 N.E.2d 598, 607 (N.Y.
1999).
90. Middlebrook Manuscript, supra note 41, at 13.
91. See generally Sarah Jane Hughes, A Call for International Legal
Standards for Emerging Retail Electronic Payment Systems, 15 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 197 (1996).
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Can we expand existing regulatory schemes to encompass
new technologies? Or, do new technologies require
separate new regulations?
 Do proposed regulations specifically have unintended
consequences that the regulators could avoid?
 Do these new services and products have privacy and
data-security concerns that are comparable to or that
exceed those in extant but analogous products and
services? If they present new concerns, how do we
manage those?
As the discussion above should demonstrate, these are
exceedingly complex questions. The purposes for regulation—
licensure, prudential regulation, and user protections, as well as
anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism style purposes—
are common to most providers of financial services and products
and to users including but not necessarily limited to consumers.
Emerging technologies should not escape regulation for these
traditional purposes—particularly not, as they so often claim,
because they are young industries and eager to “innovate.” In
these connections, perhaps a de minimis approach should allow
these innovators (and potential disruptors) to prepare to offer
services and then be required to comply as they launch their
services to the public.
Similarly, my view on the timing of regulation for any
particular provider, as well as a class of providers, depends on the
nature of the purpose for the regulation. Licensure and liquidity
issues should come before the launch to individuals whose
transactions and reputations can be damaged by failure to
complete transactions or pay bills on time. Likewise, one can
imagine expanding existing regulatory schemes—such as money
services and money transmitter regulations under state laws, and
remittance transfers and payroll card regulations under
Regulation E92—to encompass new products and providers. In
some respects, using existing regulations saves costs in terms of
crafting whole new schemes such as the BitLicense, as well as in
terms of known compliance duties that innovators can develop
into their systems such as “privacy-by-design.”
92. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text (contrasting Regulation
E with the proposed BitLicense regulations).
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Finally, some of the new products will have new privacy and
data security consequences that should be managed by regulators
in the regulation’s development and compliance phases. The
BitLicense proposal creates some new privacy issues in the form
of suspicious activity reporting to New York state authorities
beyond the federal requirements, as noted above, and its
extensive and prolonged record-keeping requirements also may
expose users’ data to additional threats related to data security.
IV. What Factors Should Drive the Decision to Regulate Virtual
Currencies or Other New Electronic Payments Products and
Services?
The 2013 and 2014 guidance from FinCEN93 and the
BitLicense proposal compel us to reconsider some basic questions
about why we regulate emerging payments products and services.
These questions include:
 Should government imperatives (deterrence of money
laundering or countering the financing of terrorism and
basic recognition of income rules) or users’ concerns
(ability to redeem value stored and resolution of
transaction errors) drive the decision to regulate?
 Are these regulatory goals compatible?
 Are the available regulatory options suitable for both sets
of goals?
These different models for regulation—government imperatives
and user protections—are not mutually exclusive reasons to
regulate emerging products, services, and providers. But if,
unlike the BitLicense proposal, one set of concerns gets out in
front of the other, its presence may drive other regulation in a
manner that the other reason might not. Thus, we need to
consider regulations in these areas as comprehensively as
possible, even as we may decide not to regulate at one time for all
of the potential reasons we ultimately might regulate the
product. This type of measured approach has been on view with
the incremental expansion of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
93. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text (discussing FinCEN’s 2013
and 2014 directions and guidance).
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from its first passage through the Credit CARD Act of 200994 and
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in
2010.95
V. Must We Choose Between Protections for Consumers and
Protections for All Users?
The BitLicense proposal contains provisions that could be
helpful to consumers, such as the consumer fraud and claims
process requirements, and others that are more generally useful
for all users, such as licensure and liquidity requirements. Our
recent regulatory history at the federal level has focused on
consumers.96 Therefore, as we comment on the BitLicense
proposal or otherwise confront additional virtual currency
regulatory efforts, we can ask ourselves at least three more
questions:
 If we regulate emerging technologies that have both
consumer and business uses, should regulations focus
primarily on consumer protection?
 Or should we also provide some protection for business
users?
 How can we best do both?
I will admit that I am still working on answers to these issues,
even after all these years.
VI. Conclusion
As the title to this Essay suggests, New York State’s bold
move to propose BitLicense regulations for virtual currencies
could prove to be the tipping point in the broader population’s
acceptance or adoption of virtual currencies. New York could
94. Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
95. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376–2223 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, and 31 U.S.C.).
96. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5567 (2012) (providing protections for
“whistleblowers” who report violations of the Dodd-Frank Act); id. § 5601
(requiring disclosures and providing “Reg. E” protections for senders of
remittance transfers).
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anoint virtual currencies by bringing them without question
under the ambit of its own regulatory authority. For other
devoted users of virtual currency today, the proposal could “spoil”
the many forms of virtual currencies because, for these
individuals, regulated products will have many of the same ills
that government-created and government-managed “legal tender”
carry—in other words, regulation could leave virtual currencies
vulnerable to manipulation for monetary policy and other
“political” purposes.
The proposed regulation raises the stakes for anyone
interested in the future of virtual currencies. Its announcement
puts it at the forefront of approaches to regulating virtual
currencies and makes it the one against which other efforts to
regulate virtual currencies for similar purposes will be measured.
The BitLicense proposal certainly re-established state regulators
as a source of innovation in the fields of prudential and consumer
protection, regulation of payments providers, and new payments
media, after some years in which federal laws preempted many
state initiatives. In this respect, it should be applauded.
The Bitcoin community is not likely to embrace New York’s
BitLicense regime because most of its members prize their
anonymity and freedom from both a centralized authority and
government “money” creation.97 The provisions that relate to
customer identification, transaction reporting, and disclosures, as
well as the one-to-one liquidity ratio, have already drawn
significant numbers of negative comments in the comment period
that was to have ended on September 5, 2014.98 The comment
97. See Jon Matonis, ECB: “Roots of Bitcoin Can Be Found in the Austrian
School
of
Economics,”
FORBES
(Nov.
3,
2012,
11:04
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/11/03/ecb-roots-of-bitcoin-can-befound-in-the-austrian-school-of-economics/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2014)
(“[P]roponents see Bitcoin as ‘a good starting point to end the monopoly central
banks have in the issuance of money’ and ‘inspired by the former gold
standard.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a more
comprehensive description of the Austrian School, see LUDWIG VON MISES
INSTITUTE, WHAT IS AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS?, http://mises.org/etexts/austrian.pdf
(summarizing theories of major proponents of free-market “money” and the
origins of the school of economic theory particularly of Carl Menger).
98. See Press Release, supra note 9 (explaining the BitLicense proposal and
its original public comment period); Matt Odell, Industry Responses to
BitLicense Guidelines, COINPRICES (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.coinprices.io/
articles/news/industry-response-to-bitlicense-guidelines (last visited Sept. 22,
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period has already been extended to October 21, 2014.99 Beyond
that, it is anyone’s guess as to what will happen next in the
regulation of virtual currencies in the United States—and
whether this particular set of regulations will result in anointing
virtual currencies with an aura of respectability to spur broader
usage or will result in removing their attractiveness entirely for
other users.

2014) (providing over a dozen critical responses to the proposal) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law review).
99. See How to Submit Comments on Proposed Virtual Currency Regulatory
Framework, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERVICES, http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/vcrf_
submit_comments.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (“A number of groups and
individuals have also requested additional time to study the proposal given that
it is the first of its kind and could potentially serve as a model for other
jurisdictions. As such, . . . [c]omments will now be due October 21, 2014.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

